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T hispaperprovidesasurvey ofthe im plicationsofpost-w arEuropean econom ic integration for
trade and incom e. A particularfocusisthe im pact on the U nited Kingdom . T he literature clearly
pointsto large effectsof the EU on trade but ism ore am bivalent about EFT A. Conventional
econom etric m odelssuggest that thisextratrade m eant that the levelofincom e in 2000 in EU
countriesw asabout9 percentlarger. Com parisonsofthe ex-postincom e gainsofEU m em bership
for the U nited Kingdom w ith ex-ante predictionsshow that the outcom e w asfar better than
optim istsexpectedinthe1970s.
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11. Introduction
At the end ofW orld W arII,it isunlikely that anybody envisaged the extent ofEuropean econom ic
integration overthe next seventy years. T he interw arperiod w asnotoriousforabacklash against
globalization that entailed com petitive devaluations, ram pant protectionism together w ith
internationalrivalriesthatprecluded effectiveeconom icco-operation. By 2014,theEuropeanU nion
com prised 28 countriesw ith acom bined populationofabout500 m illionpeopleofw hich18 shared
asinglecurrency.
T hisraisesanum berofobviousquestionsw hich thischapteraddresses. T hese include exam ining
the chronology ofeconom ic integration and review ing w hich countriesparticipated and w hat the
reasonsw ere fortheirdifferent decisions. Beyond explaining how European econom icintegration
cam e about,it isalso im portant to explore w hat w ere itseconom iceffectsboth on the grow th of
internationaltradeandalsotoevaluateitsim plicationsforlevelsandratesofgrow thofincom es.
M aking such assessm entsis,ofcourse,difficult. It requiresprediction ofthe counterfactual,i.e.,
w hat w ould have happened in the absence ofintegration. T he econom icm odelsand econom etric
techniquesem ployed to carry out thisanalysistoday are ratherdifferent from those w hich w ere
com m only used at the tim e. Forexam ple,asw e shallsee,am odern approach to m easuring the
costsand benefitsofEU m em bership forthe U nited Kingdom isvery differentfrom the m ethodsof
the 1970sw hen the econom icim plicationsofthe U K’saccession to the EEC w ere hotly debated by
British econom ists. T he im portant developm entsin econom icsinclude thinking in term sof
endogenousgrow th and gainsfrom trade thatgo beyond w elfare trianglesw hile betterprocedures
to addressissuesarising from endogenousvariablesand greatersophistication in the use ofgravity
m odelsarenotableadvancesinappliedeconom etrics.
T he chapterproceedsasfollow s. In section 2,abriefhistory ofthe contoursofpost-w arEuropean
econom icintegration isprovided w hile section 3 looksat the related issuesofthe im plicationsfor
tradecostsand tradevolum esand thereasonsfortheevolutionofthem em bershipoftheEuropean
U nion. S ection 4 investigatesthe effectson incom e levelsand grow th ratesw hile in section 5 the
history ofthedebateovertheU Km em bershipoftheEU isreview ed. S ection6 concludes.
2. Economic Integration since 1950
T he ideaofEuropean integration w as,ofcourse,not new at the end ofW orld W arII. T he 19th
century saw im portant stepstow ardsreductionsofpolicy barriersto trade w ith the unification of
Germ any and Italy and aproliferation ofcom m ercialtreaties(P ahre,2008). In the interw arperiod,
in the context ofthe tensionsresulting from W orld W arIand itspeace settlem ent,there w as
considerable interest in greater political integration of Europe w hich had its m ost notable
m anifestation in the Briand P lan for a ‘U nited S tatesof Europe’ put forw ard by the French
governm ent in M ay 1930 w ith aview to m anaging the ‘Germ an problem ’ (W eigalland S tirk,1992)
butw hichw asquickly overw helm edby events.
A successfulapproach to European econom ic integration afterW orld W arIIhad to return to the
question ofhow to m anage the relationship betw een (W est) Germ any and the rest ofW estern
Europe to obtain the benefitsofeconom iccooperation and,linked to this,also to find apolitically
acceptableform oftradeliberalization. T heapproachthatdeveloped w aspragm aticand recognized
2the continuing centralrole ofthe nation state,regulation oftrade in key areaslike agriculture and
the pursuit of industrialpolicies(M ilw ard,1992). T he design of the European Coaland S teel
Com m unity w hich becam e operationalin 1952 provided an institutionalblueprint w hich could be
adapted for w ider use. Am erican support for integration asabulw ark against the spread of
com m unism w asm adeconcretethroughtheprovisionsoftheM arshallP lan(Crafts,2013).
Against thisbackground,thissection providesabriefdescriptive outline ofthe processofpost-w ar
European econom icintegration. AsS apir(2011)hasrem inded us,thiscan usefully be approached
using the ideasofBalassa(1961). Balassadistinguished betw een different degreesofincreasingly
deep econom icintegrationw orkingup from free trade areato custom sunion,in w hich there isalso
pooling ofsovereignty in acom m on externaltrade policy,to com m on m arket,w ithin w hich factors
ofproductioncanm ovefreely,toeconom icunion,inw hichsom eeconom icpoliciesareharm onized,
to com plete econom ic integration,w here there ispoliticalunion w ith asupra-nationalauthority.
T helastm ightbethoughtofasa‘U nitedS tatesofEurope’. A listofkey datesisprovidedinT able1.
T he O rganization forEuropean Econom ic Cooperation (O EEC)w hich w asestablished in April1948
provided ‘conditionalaid’ ofabout $1.5 billion to back an intraW estern European m ultilateral
paym entsagreem ent; in 1950 recipientsofaid underthe M arshallP lan w ere required to becom e
m em bersofthe European P aym entsU nion (EP U ). T he EP U w asam echanism that addressed the
problem ofthe absence ofm ultilateraltrade settlem entsin aw orld ofinconvertible currenciesand
dollarshortage. In such circum stances,the volum e oftrade betw een each pairofcountriesis
constrained to the low erofthe am ountofim portsand exportsbecause asurplusw ith one country
cannot be used to offset adeficit w ith another. T he EP U provided am ultilateralclearing system
supplem ented by acreditline forcountriestem porarily in overalldeficit. T hisw asfacilitated by the
U nited S tatesthroughconditionalM arshallAid actingasthem ain‘structuralcreditor’ toaddressthe
difficulty thatw ould otherw ise have arisen from the prospectthatsom e countriesw ere likely to be
persistentdebtors.1
In 1958 the European Econom icCom m unity w asform ed by the originalsix countriesfollow ing the
signingoftheT reaty ofR om ein1957. T hesignatoriespledged to lay thefoundationsof‘evercloser
union’ am ongthe peoplesofEurope and Article2 com m itted m em bersto form acustom sunion,to
establish acom m onm arketand to harm onizepolicies. Article3 speltoutw hatthisw ould com prise
including acom m on externaltariff,acom m on agriculturalpolicy,the abolition ofbarriersto trade
and ofobstaclesto freedom ofm ovem ent ofcapitaland labour,acom petition policy regim e,and
the coordination ofpoliciesto avoid balance ofpaym entsdisequilibria. In contrast,the European
Free T rade Association w asset up in 1960 w ith the m uch m ore lim ited aim ofestablishing afree
tradearea. T heEEC custom sunionw asachieved in1968 butthecom m onm arkettookm uchlonger
and aw aited the S ingle European Act w hich addressed non-tariffbarriersto trade,liberalized trade
in servicesand ended capitalcontrolsand w as(lessthan fully) im plem ented from 1992. T he
M aastricht T reaty of1992 w asasignificant step tow ardseconom icunion and paved the w ay to a
singlecurrency w hichfurtherreducedtradecostsasw ellaselim inatingexchangerateinstability;the
Eurostartedin1999,initialy w ith11 countries. Com pleteeconom icintegrationisstilloutofreach.
1 ForafulleraccountoftheintricatedetailsoftheoperationoftheEuropeanP aym entsU nion,see
Eichengreen(1993).
3O vertim e,the m em bership ofthe EEC/EU expanded considerably through successive enlargem ents
w hile thatofEFT A hasshrunkw ith defectionsto theEEC/EU . In 1973,the U nited Kingdom and tw o
ofitsclosetradingpartners,Denm arkand Ireland joined theEU . Inthe1980s,thenew ly dem ocratic
Greece,P ortugaland S painacceded and in1995,follow ingtheestablishm entoftheEuropeanS ingle
M arket,Austria,Finland and S w eden left EFT A to join the EU . In 2004,8 form ercom m unist-bloc
transition econom iesjoined the EU togetherw ith Cyprusand M altafollow ed by furthertransition
econom iesaccessionsby Bulgariaand R om aniain2007 and Croatiain2013 w hileanum berofthese
new m em bersw ere adm itted into the Eurozone soon afteraccession. T hese southern and eastern
enlargem entsofthe EU ,especially the latter,considerably increased the range ofincom e levels
w ithintheEU .
3. Implications for Trade
European econom ic integration has had significant im pacts on the extent and direction of
internationaltrade. Asthese im plicationsbecam e apparent,thisinform ation influenced non-
m em bers’ perceptionsofthe costsand benefitsofm em bership ofEFT A versusthe EEC/EU . T he
integration processinvolved reductionsin trade costsand,of course,thisw asconducive to
increasing the volum e of trade. How ever,regional trade agreem entsby their very nature
discrim inate betw een m em bersand outsidersratherthan applying m ost-favoured-nation principles
to trade liberalization. T he EEC and EFT A w ere acceptable underArticle X X IV ofthe GAT T but
involved both trade creation and trade diversion asbarriersto trade w ere unevenly reduced. In
otherw ords,w hile in m ost caseseconom ic efficiency w asincreased through the replacem ent of
higher-cost by low er-cost producers,there w ould be som e instancesw here the opposite w astrue.
T hisalso im pliesthe possibility that there w ere externallosersasw ellasinternalw innersand that
theoveralleconom icoutcom ew asanetsum ofgainspartly offsetby losses.
T able 2 reportsestim atesofreductionsin trade costsobtained using agravity m odel.2 T rade costs
inferred in thisw ay are acom posite ofallbarriersto trade and therefore include the im pact of
transport costsasw ellaspolicy m easures. How ever,the m ajorinfluence in these decades,and
certainly the m ajordifference betw een these pairsofcountries,accrued from the pace oftrade
liberalizationastheprotectionism oftheinterw arperiodw asreversed. O verall,thepictureisoneof
large reductionsin trade coststo levelsw hich w erem uch low erthan in 1929. Itisalso very striking
that these reductionsstart sooneram ong the original6 EEC m em bers,w ere delayed forU K and
S pain,and w erequitem odestforpairsofEFT A countriespre-1970,asT able2 illustrates. O bviously,
notalltradeliberalizationw asundertheauspicesoftheregionaltradeagreem ents,asisepitom ized
by the im portant S panish reform sof1959 (P radosde laEscosuraet al.,2010). Finally,it isw orth
notingthatontheseestim atestradecostsstoppedfallingduringthelate1980s.
T he volum e ofinternationaltrade increased very substantially betw een 1960 and 2000,asisshow n
inT able3. O verall,thetradeofEU 15 countriesgrew fasterthanw orldtradeandalsotradebetw een
thesecountriesgrew fasterthantheirtradew iththerestofthew orld,althoughthisw asnottruefor
all15 countriesw here Ireland notably standsoutasan exception to thisgeneralization. T hisraises
the question ofhow farthe variouscom ponentsofEuropean econom icintegration contributed to
2 S trictly speaking,theseestim atesarereductionsinthecostofinternationaltraderelativetodom estictrade.
4these trade patternscom pared w ith otherfactorssuch asincom e grow thorconvergence in incom e
levels.
T he m ost w idely-used approach to answ ering questionsofthiskind isto rely on som e version ofa
gravity m odeloftrade. Ashasbecom e w ell-know n,there are anum berofseriouseconom etric
pitfallsw hich can lead to seriously biased resultsfrom such studiesand w hich w ere prevalent in
papersw rittenbeforethem id-2000s. Inw hatfollow s,resultsarereported from w hatIthinkarethe
m ost convincing papersavailable but necessarily som e ofthese are ofarelatively old vintage and
m ay perhapsneedtobetreatedw ithadegreeofcaution.
An analysisofthe datain T able 3 using panelestim ation ofagravity m odelby Badingerand Breuss
(2004)found thatby farthe largestreasonforthe grow thofintra-EU tradebetw een1960 and 2000
w asincom e grow th w hich accounted for about 70 per cent w hile reduction of tariff barriers
accounted for19 to 26 percent depending on the specification. S ince trade increased m assively
overall,thism eansthat the tariffreductionshad am ajorim pact. T he resultsappearsom ew hat
differentfrom those in Baieretal.(2008)w ho found thatEU m em bership raisestradebetw eentw o
countriesby anaverageof100 to125 percentafter15 yearsoranaverageof4.8 to5.6 percentper
year;thisim pliesthatthe reduction in trade barriersaccounted forabout50 to 55 percentoftotal
intra-EU trade grow th.3 T hissuggeststhat EU m em bership reducestrade costsby m ore than is
captured by tariffreductionsperse. S im ilarly,Baieret al.(2008)com pare EU m em bership w ith
being in eitherEFT A orthe EEA and find thatitseffectsw ere considerably larger. T he EEA effectis
only about1/5th thatoftheEU w hiletheEFT A effectissim ilarto theEEA effectbutlessrobustsince
insom especificationsitisapproxim ately zero.
T he first step tow ardsgreaterintegration ofEuropean trade w asthe establishm ent in 1950 ofthe
European P aym entsU nion. T he design forEuropean tradingarrangem entsw asnegotiated,notably
w ith regard to British and French concerns,ratherthan im posed and the EP U did not m atch the
originalAm erican plansfor afree-trade custom sunion and early current-account convertibility
(M ilw ard,1984). N evertheless,the EP U represented an im portant successasam echanism for
restoring W estGerm any to itscentralrole in the European econom y (Bergerand R itschl,1995)and
for prom oting trade grow th. T he EP U w asasecond-best w ay of reviving European trade and
m ultilateralsettlem entscom pared w ith fullcurrent-account convertibility but it speeded up the
processby solving acoordination problem . Itlasted until1958 by w hich tim e intra-European trade
w as2.3 tim esthat of1950 and agravity-m odelanalysisconfirm sthat the EP U had alarge positive
effect on trade levels,especially in the early 1950sw hen it isestim ated to have raised intra-EP U
exportsby about30 percentcom paredw ithonly about10 percentin1958 (Eichengreen,1993). As
m ight be expected,the EP U increased trade relatively strongly (about2 or3 tim esm ore)w ithin its
boundariesbutitseffectsontradebetw eenEP U andnon-EP U countriesw ereneverthelesspositive.
Analyseshave also been undertaken for further stepsalong the path of European integration,
notably by Bayoum iand Eichengreen(1995)w hoseresultsaresum m arized inT able4. T hey w orked
w ith agravity equation specified in term soffirst differencesand they found that each ofthe
episodesw hich they exam ined entailed trade creation and trade diversion but that the form er
typically w asthe largereffectand quite sizeable. T he question ofthe relative size oftrade creation
3 T heEU effectdoesvary quitealotdependingontheprecisespecificationofthegravity equation;theresults
quotedherecom efrom theauthors’ preferredspecifications.
5and trade diversion w asintensively studied forthe early yearsofthe EC6 through avariety of
differentm ethodsw hich cam e to aconsensusthattrade creation w asm uch biggerw ith an average
estim ateofabout20 percentofEC im portscom pared w ith3.8 percentofextra-EC exports.4 M uch
the sam e story com esfrom along view w ith an explicit tim e-varying econom etric specification
provided by S traathofet al.(2008). T hey find that trade diversion w asvery sm all,that EFT A had
m uch sm aller(and possibly insignificant)effectson trade,and that trade creation rose appreciably
afterenlargem entsandw iththeS ingleM arket.
S apir(2001)extended these analysesby consideringEC-EFT A trade relationshipsin m ore detail. He
found that both intra-EFT A and intra-EC trade w ere boosted initially by fairly sim ilar am ounts
relativetonon-preferentialtrade. How ever,by theyears1989-92 intra-EFT A tradew asestim atedto
be1.6 to1.7 tim essm allerthanintra-EC tradeand EC-EFT A trade1.4 to1.5 tim essm allerthanintra-
EC trade so that the advent ofthe S ingle M arket appearsto have increased trade diversion to the
detrim ent ofEFT A m em bers. At the sam e tim e,5 EFT A countriesapplied forEC m em bership and
S apir(2001) suggested that thisreflected afurther‘dom ino effect’,ashypothesized by Baldw in
(1993).5 T he dom ino hypothesisisthatw hereasinitialdecisionsto participate in trade agreem ents
are often m otivated by politicalconsiderations,asw asthe case w ith the EC6 spurred on by the aim
ofsecuring the peace and,notably,w ith the U K’srefusalto sign the T reaty ofR om e prom pted by
issuesofrelationshipsw ith the Com m onw ealth and the U nited S tates,subsequentpressuresto join
em ergefrom thetradediversionary effects. T hefirstdom inoeffectw asthattheU Kquickly changed
itsm ind and itsapplication w asfollow ed by countriesforw hich the U K w asam ain tradingpartner,
nam ely,Denm arkandIreland.
T he finalstep in the reduction ofw estern European trade costscam e w ith European M onetary
U nion. T hisisaclassic case w here m ore sophisticated estim ation procedureshave m ade ahuge
difference. T he currency union effect on trade volum esw asinitially thought to be very large but
bettereconom etricsand theopportunity toexam inetheactualim pactofEM U led toestim atesthat
trade volum esincreased by only about 2 percent (Baldw in et al.,2008)orpossibly no effect at all
(BergerandN itsch,2008;S traathofetal.,2008).
4. Implications for Income Levels and Growth Rates
Econom ic theory suggestsvariousw aysin w hich econom ic integration m ight increase prosperity
includingbothstaticanddynam iceffects. O vertim e,therangeofpossibilitiesthattheory allow shas
increased considerably although m ost,ifnot all,ofthese w ere understood inform ally even in the
early days. T he econom ichistorian m ightalso w antto distinguish betw een im pactsthatw ere only
achieved through the form ation ofthe European Econom icCom m unity (orindeed EFT A)and those
w hichw ouldhaveaccruedthroughalternativeroutestointegration(BolthoandEichengreen,2008).
In term sofshort-run static effects,trade liberalization can im prove allocative efficiency and/or
productiveefficiency,i.e.,givenexistingcosts,factorsofproductionaredeployed m oreefficiently or
production costsare low ered. T he form erm ight result from greaterspecialization along linesof
com parative advantage and the latter from anew found ability to realize econom iesof scale.
4 BadingerandBreuss(2011)reportthattheaverageofsix studiespublishedintheearly 1970sw asthattrade
creationraisedim portsoftheEC6 by $9.52 billionandreducedextra-EC exportsby $0.32 billion.
5 Econom etricsupportforthe‘dom inoeffect’ hypothesiscanbefoundinBaldw inandJaim ovich(2012).
6Insofarasfreertradeincreasescom petitioninproductm arkets(throughactualorpotentialentry),it
m ay have both effectsasm arket pow erisreduced and price-cost m arginsfallw hile m anagersof
firm sarepressured toreducecoststothem inim um feasible(principalagentproblem sarereduced).
Iftrade integration increasesthe num berofvarietiesthat are available to consum ersthism ay also
beasourceofw elfaregains.
W ith am edium -term perspective,the capitalstock adjuststo ahigher levelof productivity or
perhapsareduction inthepriceofcapitalgoodsand afurtherincrease inthelevelofoutputcan be
expected. Furtherm ore,asbarriersto capitalm obility are reduced,relocation ofeconom icactivity
m ay beaconsequence,possibly basedonm atchingindustrialandregionalcharacteristicsonafactor
endow m entsbasis(Heckscher-O hlin) or possibly based on m arket accessconsiderations(N ew
Econom icGeography). W ritersinthelattertraditionenvisageastrongpossibility thattheprocessof
relocation can lead to divergence ofincom e levelsw ith som e regionsbeing disadvantaged,asin
core-periphery m odels.
Interm soflong-rundynam iceffects,accordingtoendogenousgrow thm odels,itispossiblethatthe
grow thratew illrise asaresultofeconom icintegration. In abasicAKm odelifinvestm ent(orm ore
generally the rate ofgrow th ofthe capitalstock) respondspositively there isno tendency for
dim inishing returnsto erode thisinitialeffectso there isa‘perm anent’ im pacton grow th. P erhaps
m ore plausibly,if a larger m arket and/or m ore com petition in product m arketsensuesfrom
econom icintegrationthism ay raisetherateofinnovationandT FP grow th.
T he sim plest approach to m easuring increasesin (equivalent) incom e from European econom ic
integration isto calculate w elfare-triangle gainsfrom im proved allocative efficiency in the tradition
of Harberger.  An approxim ation is to use the form ula 0.5*Δ t*Δ T C w here t is the tariff rate and T C is 
the volum e oftrade creation. An early exam ple w asBalassa(1975) w ho estim ated that trade
creation in m anufacturesin 1970 forthe originalEEC6 w as$11.4 billion,that the average tariff
reduction w as12 percent and the w elfare gain w as$0.7 billion = 0.15 percent ofGDP .6 A m ore
recentcalculation forthe im pactofthe European S ingle M arketw asthatthe w elfare-trianglesgain
from reducedtradecostsw ouldbeabout0.5 percentofEU GDP (Harrisonetal.,1994).
Balassarecognised that there w ould be otherprobably m uch m ore im portant im pactson incom e
levelsfrom com petition,econom iesofscale and induced capitalform ation but did not really have
any convincing w ay to estim ate these. O w en (1983)provided an estim ate of$8.5 billion forthe
gainsfrom com petition and econom iesofscale in m anufacturesforthe EEC6 in 1970 based on
extrapolating from asm allsam ple ofm icro-levelinvestigations;togetherw ith the w elfare triangle
gainthetotalis1.8 + 0.15 = 1.95 percentofGDP . A conventional,albeitcrude,allow anceforcapital
stockadjustm entm ightraisethistoabout2.8percentofGDP .7
Harrison etal.(1994),w orking w ith aCGE m odelthatallow sforincreasing returnsin som e sectors,
changesin price-cost m ark-upsand capitalstock adjustm ent projected that com petition and scale
effectsresultingfrom theS ingle M arketw ould raiseEU GDP by 0.7 percentand the totalim pacton
6 S im ilarresultsw ouldbeobtainedgiventheform ulaforany reasonableestim ateoftradecreation;the
w elfaregainisalw ayssm allrelativetoGDP . InsofarastheCom m onAgriculturalP olicy entailedtrade
diversion,therew ouldbeaw elfaretriangleslosstooffsetthetradecreationgain.
7 T hiscalculationassum esaCobb-Douglasproductionfunctionw ithaconstantcapitaltooutputratioin
equilibrium .  T hen the total im pact on output is Δ A/A/(1 –  α) w here α = 0.3 is the share of capital in incom e. 
7EU GDP oftheS ingleM arketw ould be2.6 percent.8 Ex-poststudieshave suggested sim ilareffects;
for exam ple,Ilzkovitz et al. (2007) estim ated GDP had been raised by 2.2 per cent by 2006.
Establishing atrue S ingle M arket in servicescould probably double thisim pactby reducing barriers
to entry but governm ents still have considerable discretion to m aintain these barriers
notw ithstanding the S ervicesDirective (Badingerand M aydell,2009). A recentestim ate isthatthis
im plem entation of thisdirective hasso far raised EU GDP by about 0.8 per cent w hereasfull
im plem entationw ouldtriplethis(M onteagudoetal.,2012).9
T hese detailed studiesofthe im pact ofthe originalcom m on m arket and the latersingle m arket
suggest each had sim ilar usefulbut not spectacular im pactson the levelof incom e. Clearly,
how ever,they do notencom passallthe econom icintegration thathastaken place and they do not
necessarily capture allthe im pact it hashad – forexam ple,they are noticeably silent on dynam ic
effects. Alternative approachesw hich attem pt to capture aw iderrange ofim pacts,albeit w ithout
identifying these individually,rely on regression techniquesto identify the im pact ofeconom ic
integrationonincom eorchangesinincom e. T hreevariantsofthisapproachthatofferusefulresults
arethefollow ing.
First,asnoted by Boltho and Eichengreen (2008),the w ell-know n paperby Frankeland R om er
(1999)can be used to postulate arelationship betw een the ratio oftotaltrade exposure (exports+
im ports)/GDP and the levelofGDP . A conventionalversion ofthism ight be to project that an
exogenous1 percentage point increase in trade exposure w ould raise GDP by 0.5 per cent.10
ApplyingthistotheEU in2000 onthebasisoftheestim ateby Baieretal.(2008)thattheEU ‘shock’
had raised intra-EU trade by 100 to 125 percent,from acounterfactualintra-EU trade exposure of
15.6 to 17.3 percentofGDP to the actualintra-EU trade exposure of34.6 percent. T he estim ated
im pactonEU GDP isanincreaseof8.6 to9.5 percent.
S econd,grow th regressionscan be used to estim ate the effect ofEuropean integration on incom e
grow th. Here the m ost usefulpaper isBadinger (2005) w hich m ade an index of the levelof
European integration foreach EU 15 country from 1950 to 2000 and in apanel-regression setting
w ith suitable controlsexam ined itsrelationship w ith grow th and w ith investm ent. T he integration
index w hichtookaccountbothofGAT T liberalizationand Europeantradeagreem entsshow sthat55
percentofthe protectionism of1950 w aselim inated betw een 1958 and 1975,afigure w hich then
rosesteadily to 87 percentby 2000. T heresultsoftheregressionsw erethatchangesinintegration
w ere positive for grow th but that the levelof integration had no effect and that changesin
integration had som ew here betw een halfand three quartersoftheirim pact through investm ent
w iththerem aindercom ingfrom changesinT FP . Acrossthe EU 15 asaw holeGDP w asestim ated to
be 26 percent higherthan ifthere had been no econom ic integration after1950 w ith anarrow
range from 21.6 percentforS w eden to 28.9 percent forP ortugal. T he peakeffecton the levelof
incom e resulting from the rapid liberalization priorto 1975 w ould have raised the grow th rate over
the period by about 1 percent peryear– im pressive but only about aquarterofthe w estern
8 T hisisw ellbelow theoptim isticprojectionsoftheCecchiniR eportissuedby theEuropeanCom m issionw hich
projected4.8to6.4 percentofGDP beforeany im pactfrom capitalstockadjustm entbutisinlinew ithother
academ icex-antestudies(BadingerandBreuss,2011,T able14.3).
9 T hisdoesnotincludeany im pactfrom capitalstockadjustm ent.
10 FrankelandR om er(1999)offeredarangeofestim atesofthiscoefficientw ith0.5 atthebottom end. A
sim ilarvaluew asusedby HM T reasury initsassessm entoftheeffectsontheU Keconom y ofjoiningtheEuro.
8European grow th rate in a period of rapid catch-up grow th (Craftsand T oniolo,2008). T he
im plication of the resultsin Badinger (2005) isthat European econom ic integration hashad a
sizeable im pact on the levelofincom e but hasnot had aperm anent effect on the rate ofgrow th.
T hisam ountstorejectingtheendogenousgrow thhypothesisandislinew ithrecentinvestigationsof
the im pact oftrade liberalizationsusing difference-in-difference approaches(Estevadeordaland
T aylor,2013).
T hird,anew approach in the style of ‘w ith-w ithout’ com parisonsisavailable in the synthetic
counterfactualsm ethod ofCam poset al.(2014). T hiscom paresgrow th in each post-EU accession
country w ith grow th in aw eighted com bination ofothercountriesw hich did notaccede and w hich
are chosen to m atch the accession country before itsentry to the EU asclosely aspossible. R esults
forcountriesw hich joined the EU betw een 1973 and 1995 are reported in T able 5. Forthese
countries,the average im pactofEU m em bership after10 yearsisestim ated to have been a6.4 per
centincom e gainbutw ithaw iderange betw eenP ortugalat+16.5 percentand Greece at-17.3 per
cent.
T he different experiencesofGreece and Ireland afterjoining the EU raisesthe issue ofw hether
European econom icintegration hasbeen conducive to convergence ordivergence ofincom e levels
acrossthe EU and w hetherthe com m onm arkethasencouraged spatialconcentration ordispersion
ofeconom ic activity asfirm shave aw iderchoice oflocationsand capitalstock adjustm entstake
placepartly acrossinternationalborders.
T able6 reportstheresultsofconvergenceregressionsforthesetofEuropeanregionsforw hichdata
existfor1950 Itprovidesevidence ofunconditionalconvergence both before and after1973 butin
the latterperiod thisisquite w eak. W hilst peripherality perse doesnot seem to retard grow th,
population density isan advantage. T able 7 reportsregressionssim ilar to those perform ed in
Venables(2005)foracom m on setofregionsacrossthree cross-sections. T he resultsshow thatthe
levelofrealGDP perperson w asalw ayshigherin m ore densely populated regionsand w asalw ays
low erin regionsrelatively faraw ay from the centre ofEurope. Interestingly,how ever,both the
disadvantagesofperipherality and the advantagesofdensity w ere greater in the disintegrated
Europe ofthe 1950s. R eductionsin the dispersion ofrealGDP perperson acrossthese European
regionshave reflected reductionsin core-periphery inequality betw een countriesratherthan w ithin
countriesw ith the T heilindex ofinequality ofrealGDP perperson betw een countriesfalling from
0.055 in 1950 to 0.013 in 1973 and 0.002 in 2005 but the w ithin country index changing little from
0.036 in1950 to0.034 in1973 and0.038 in2005.
N ew econom ic geography m odelssuggest that reductionsin trade costsm ay lead to industry to
m ove to locationsw ith proxim ity to m arketsbecause they perm it realization ofeconom iesofscale
orbecause it isadvantageousto locate close to eithercustom ersorsuppliers. Em piricalevidence
suggeststhat m arket accesshasm attered forindustriallocation,becom ing m ore im portant for
industriesw ith strong backw ard and forw ard linkages,but neverthelessonly asubset of industries
have becom e m ore spatially concentrated (M idelfart-Knarviketal.,2000). A reason forthism ay be
the very low levelofinternationalm igration w ithin the EU (P uga,1999). O verall,EU countrieshave
becom e slow ly m ore specialized in production overtim e aseconom ic integration hasprogressed
w ith the averageoftheKrugm an specializationindex acrosstheEU 15 risingfrom 0.409 in1970-3 to
90.445 in 1994-7,although at the end ofthe 20th century industriesin the EU rem ained m uch less
spatially concentratedthanintheU nitedS tates(M idelfartetal.,2003).
European integration hasbeen accom panied by the patternsofspatialdisparity highlighted by the
new econom ic geography. N ot only are there are agglom eration effectson productivity (Ciccone,
2002)but there isalso clearevidence that m arket access,w hich,ofcourse,exhibitsastrong core-
periphery profile,hasastrongpositiveim pactonlevelsofregionalGDP perperson. Breinlich(2006)
found acrudeelasticity ofabout0.25 orabout0.07 controllingforhum anandphysicalcapitalstocks
and density; using the latterestim ate im pliesthat m oving the Algarve to Cologne w ould raise its
labourproductivity by 20 percent.
It w asabout 15 yearsafteracceding to the EU that Irish econom icgrow th tookoffinto very rapid
(and belated)catch-up grow th during itsCelticT igerphase w hich lasted tillthe early 21st century.
T hissuccessclearly w aspredicated on being w ithin the EU butalso w asbased on the developm ent
ofappropriate supply-side policiesto exploitthisopportunity. S trong grow th in em ploym entw asa
key feature ofthe period asthe N AIR U felldram atically and m igration flow sreversed. R apid T FP
grow thw asunderpinnedby alargeICT productionsectorbasedonFDI.
A centralaspectofthe CelticT igereconom y w asthe prom inence offoreign directinvestm ent(FDI).
‘Export-platform ’ FDItransform ed Ireland’srevealed com parative advantage,dom inated production
in high-skill and know ledge-intensive sectors, and by 2000 accounted for alm ost half of
m anufacturing em ploym ent and 80 percent ofm anufacturing exports(Barry,2004). In term sof
industrialpolicy,Ireland developed asophisticated system to select projectsforfinancialsupport
through the IndustrialDevelopm ent Agency and m ade investm entsin telecom m unicationsand
collegeeducationthatw ereconducivetoFDI(Buckley andR uane,2006).
N evertheless,them ostim portantfactorinIreland’ssuccessinattractingFDIw asthecom binationof
itscorporate tax regim e together w ith EU m em bership (S laughter,2003). It isclear from the
literaturethatthe sem i-elasticity ofFDIw ith respectto the corporatetax rate isquite high,perhaps
oftheorderof-2.5 oreven-3.5 (O ECD,2007). AtthestartoftheCelticT igerperiodtheIrishtax rate
form anufacturing FDIw aseasily the low est in Europe and astudy by Gropp and Kostial(2000)
suggested that the stock ofAm erican m anufacturing investm ent in Ireland w asabout 70 percent
higherthan ifIreland had had atax rateequivalentto the nextlow estin the EU . Astrade costsfell,
the im pact oflow taxeson FDIappearsto have been accentuated significantly and theirrelative
im portanceforlocationcom paredw ithproxim ity todem andincreased(R om alis,2007).
5. Implications of EU Membership for the United Kingdom: Changing Perceptions
T he U K’sm em bership ofthe EEC orEU hasalw aysbeen som ew hat controversialam ong British
econom istsand politicians. W ithin2 yearsofaccession,theU Kheld areferendum in1975 todecide
w hetherto stay in and,ifthe Conservativesw in the 2015 Generalelection it isexpected that a
sim ilarreferendum w illbeheld in2017. T hisdebate,and itsevolutionthroughtim e,deservessom e
attention. At the sam e tim e,it isinteresting to com pare the analysesm ade by econom istsbefore
and afterentry. T he latterw ere m ade w ith superiorinform ation,obviously,but also w ith m ore
sophisticated econom ics. T he standard approach in recentyearsto evaluating the im pacton trade
and grow th ofthe U K w ithdraw ing from the EU orofthe U K staying out ofthe Euro israther
differentfrom the1970s’ approachestom easuringbenefitsandcostsofm em bership.
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Ex-ante analysesofthe econom ic effectsofU K entry into the EEC paid alot ofattention to the
expected negative im pact on the balance ofpaym ents,the dow nsidesofthe Com m on Agricultural
P olicy and net U K budget paym entsw hich w ere regarded asdefinite costs(albeit ofsom ew hat
debatable m agnitude) to be borne in return forthe potential(but unknow able) benefitsin the
industrialsectorofeconom iesofscaleand greatercom petition.11 T helatterw ereseenasconducive
to reductionsboth in m arket pow erand in X -inefficiency. T he CAP (and the associated budgetary
contributions)w asrelatively onerousforthe U K asafood im porterw ith asm allagriculturalsector.
Itw asagreed thatthe w elfare triangle gainsfrom trade creation w ould be quite sm all. T he w elfare
im plicationsofpredicted balance ofpaym entseffectsw ere calculated viathe term softrade effects
ofthe exchange rate adjustm ent required to correct adeficit using the M arshal-L ernerconditions.
T hefindingsofsom ew ell-know npapersofthetim earesum m arizedinT able8.
Ex-post analysesfound sim ilarresultsin term softhe direction ofthe effectsbut in som e respects
quitedifferentm agnitudes,notably,w ithregardtothebalanceofpaym entsdeficitinm anufacturing
(W inters,1987)and the w elfare gainsfrom com petition,even though analysisofthese gainsw as
restricted to the static effectsofreductionsin m arket pow er(Gasiorek et al.,2002).Both these
papersused considerably m oreadvanced m ethodsto com putetheirestim atesthanhad theex-ante
studies.12 Adding up allthe num bersin the ex-post colum n seem sto give am ore optim istic
assessm ent ofthe net w elfare im pact ofthe U K’sentry into the EEC – the gam ble seem sto have
paid offw ith alargerpaym entsdeficit in m anufacturesbeing m ore than offset by greaterbenefits
from com petition. In fact,the estim atesby Cam poset al.(2014)reported in T able 5 ofm edium -
term grow th in the U K com pared w ith asynthetic counterfactual(an 8.6 percent rise in GDP )
suggestthat‘dynam icgains’ notincludedinT able8rew ardedthisgam blehandsom ely.
How ever,in the 1970savocalgroup ofeconom istsargued that balance ofpaym entsdeficitsw ere
m uch m ore costly to correct than orthodox econom icsassum ed. In aw orld ofrelatively im m obile
internationalcapitalw hich seem ed to exclude financing such deficitsthrough the capitalaccount
thisloom ed large.T he Cam bridge Econom ic P olicy Group m odelem bodied an assum ption ofreal
w age rigidity w hich precluded the use of devaluation and required (perm anent) reductionsin
aggregate dem and to hold dow n im ports. O n thisanalysis,the w elfare costw asabout3 tim esthe
balance ofpaym entsdeficit (Bacon et al.,1978).13 T hus,the overallim pact ofentry w asseen by
these econom istsasadverse,especially once the m anufactured trade deficit had becom e clear(cf.
T able8).
Indeed,theCEP G argum entw entfurtherthanthissinceitem bracedtheneed forperm anentim port
controlsto allow expansion ofaggregate dem and and avoid abalance ofpaym entsconstraint on
grow th. T hisw asplainly incom patible w ith the m em bership ofthe EEC and im plied the need for
exit. Analysesofthiskind becam e popularw ith advocatesofan ‘alternative econom icstrategy’ on
the left ofthe L abourP arty w hich held considerable sw ay. In 1981,the L abourP arty adopted an
11 T he‘estim ates’ incolum n(2)ofT able8 w ereadm ittedby W illiam son(1971)tobelargely guessw orkw hile
theauthorsofcolum n(1)did notevenattem ptany suchestim ates,m erely notinghow largetheseeffects
w ouldhavetobetooffsetthenetw elfarelossesfrom theotherelem entsoftheirestim ates.
12 W inters(1987)usedafully-articulatedAIDS approachtom odellingthedem andforim portsandGasioreket
al.(2002)em ployedacom putablegeneralequilibrium m odelw ithim perfectcom petitionandscaleeconom ies
insom em anufacturingsectors.
13 R atherthanabout1/3rd,asinT able8;theassum ptionofrealw agerigidity hasnoem piricalvalidity andw as
soonrejectedby m ainstream econom ists,see,forexam ple,O ECD (1989).
11
officialpolicy ofw ithdraw alfrom the EEC and thisw asin itsm anifesto forthe 1983 election. T he
rationalew astoperm itgreatergovernm entinterventionintheeconom y.
In retrospect,how ever,itseem sclearthatabandoningprotectionism ratherthan em bracingim port
controlsserved the British econom y w ell,especially through favourable im pactson productivity
perform ance consequent on stronger com petition and entry threatsin product m arkets. T he
averageeffectiverateofprotectionfellfrom 9.3% in1968 to4.7% in1979,and1.2% in1986 (Ennew
et al.,1990). T rade liberalization in itsvariousguisesreduced price-cost m argins(Hitiris,1978;
Griffith,2001). A difference-in-differencesanalysisfound that there w asasubstantialboost to
productivity in sectorsw hich experienced alarge reduction in protection (Broadberry and Crafts,
2011).14
T he w elfare gainsfrom the effect ofEEC entry on com petition w ere probably considerably bigger
thanthosecapturedby theGasioreketal.(2002)m odelsincereductionsinm arketpow ereffectively
addressed long-standing im pedim entsto productivity perform ance from w eak m anagem ent and
industrialrelationsproblem sinBritishfirm s. N ickelletal.(1997)estim ated that,forfirm sw ithouta
dom inant external shareholder (the norm for big British firm sat thistim e),a reduction in
supernorm alprofitsfrom 15 to 5 percent ofvalue added w ould raise totalfactorproductivity
grow th by 1 percentage point. T he 1980ssaw asurge in productivity grow th in unionized firm sas
organizationalchange tookplace underpressure ofcom petition (M achin and W adhw ani,1989)and
de-recognition ofunionsin the context ofincreasesin foreign com petition had astrong effect on
productivity grow thby thelate1980s(Greggetal.,1993). T hisgoesalongw ay to explaintheboost
togrow thfoundby Cam posetal.(2014).
T he contrastw ith today’seconom ists’ evaluationsofthe im plicationsofapossible British exitfrom
the EU isstriking. T hisispartly because concern w ith (and m easurem ent of)balance ofpaym ents
effectshasdisappeared. Beyond this,how ever,the argum entsrelating to trade are about w hat
futurew illofferm oreliberalizationratherthanw hethertradeliberalizationw illhavepositiveeffects
w ellin excessofaw elfare-trianglesgain orw hetherprotectionism could be good forgrow th. T hat
said,new issueshave com e to the fore in politicaldebate including issuesrelating to EU -im posed
regulationandtoim m igrationw hichdidnotfeature40 yearsago.
T able9 displaysestim atesofstaticw elfareeffectsofaU K exitfrom theEU m adeby O ttavianoetal.
(2014). T hese are based on a‘short-cut’ m ethod w hich avoidsthe need for estim ation of a
structuralm odelbutallow sm onopolisticcom petitionand scaleeffectsto beaccom m odated. L ikely
changesin tariffsand non-tariffbarriersto trade are taken into account both in term softhe initial
situation and the possibility ofbeing excluded from furtherreductionsin N T Bsw ithin the S ingle
M arket. T hisisseen asthe biggest dow nside ofexit and w ould contribute the lion’sshare ofthe
w elfarelossof3.09 percentinthepessim isticscenario.15
14 S ectorsw hichexperiencedareductionof10 percentagepointsorm oreintheeffectiverateofprotection
saw anadditionalincreaseof1.4 percentagepointsintherateoflabourproductivity grow thin1979-86 over
1968-79.
15 An attem pttom odeltheim plicationsofcom pleterem ovalofbarriersto tradew ithintheEU suggested that
thiscouldprovideaw elfaregaintotheU Kof7percentofGDP (Aussilloux etal.,2011).
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Ashasbecom estandard intheliteratureontheim pactoftradew iththeEU ontheBritisheconom y,
these authorsalso provide avariantofaFrankeland R om er(1999)type estim ate w hich potentially
capturesaw iderarray ofeffects. T hisisbased on the assum ption that the reduction in trade
associatedw ithexitfrom theEU w ouldbeaspredictedby thedifferencebetw eenbeinginEU andin
EFT A in the gravity m odelofBaieretal.(2008). T hisistaken to reduce trade w ith the EU by 25 per
centoroveralltradeby 12.6% andincom eby 6.3 to9.5 percent.16
A caseinfavourofBritishexithasbeenm adeby L eetal.(2011). T hey notethattheEU stillim poses
barriersagainst im portsthrough the com m on externaltariffand the CAP and argue that the U K
could benefit by leaving the EU and adopting apolicy ofunilateralfree trade.17 T he staticw elfare
gainsare put at 2.5 to 3.5 percent ofU K GDP . How ever,abiggerbenefit m ight accrue through
escaping possible future labour-m arket regulations w hich w ould raise unem ploym ent. An
illustrativecalculationisprovidedthatthiscouldhavealevels-effectim pactof6.4 percentofGDP .
T hese days,Euro-scepticvoicesin the U K frequently raise the issue ofexcessive EU regulation and
the coststhatitim poseson the British econom y. How ever,thiscase hasnotyetbeen persuasively
m ade. Gaskelland P ersson (2010)review ed the regulatory im pact assessm entsofthislegislation
from 1998 onw ardsand found thatoverallitaveraged abenefit-costratio of1.02. Itshould also be
noted that the U K haspersistently been able to m aintain very light levelsofregulation in term sof
key O ECD indicatorssuch asP M R (P roduct M arket R egulation) and EP L (Em ploym ent P rotection
L egislation)forw hichhighscoreshavebeenshow ntohavedetrim entaleconom iceffects(Barneset
al.,2011). In 2013,the U K had aP M R score of1.09 and an EP L score of1.12,the second and third
low estintheO ECD,respectively.
U nlike the 1970s,im m igration from the EU hasbecom e acontroversialissue in the U K recently.
P artly,thism ay bebecausedifficulteconom ictim esgeneratepopulistresponsesbutitalsoreflectsa
m uch greatervolum eofm igrationand the accessionofcountriesinw hichw agesarem uchlow erto
the EU . T he stockofEEA im m igrantsto the U K rose from 0.9 to 2.8 m illionbetw een1995 and 2011
ofw hom 0.4 m illion w ere em ployed in 1995 and 1.5 m illion in 2011. Despite itsbad press,the
econom ic im pact of thisim m igration w asm ost probably positive. R esearch suggeststhat the
increase in the m igrant share ofthe U K labourforce betw een 1997 and 2007 m ight have raised
labour productivity of dom estic w orkersthrough spillover effectsby betw een 0.27 and 0.40
percentagepoints(R olfeetal.,2013)w hileadetailed study ofthe fiscaleffectsfound that,contrary
tom uchpoliticaldiscourse,EEA im m igrantsm adeanetfiscalcontributionestim ated at£28.7 billion
(at2011 prices)betw een2001 and2011 (Dustm annandFratinni,2014).
In sum ,it seem sthat the U K hasexperienced w elfare gainsfrom itsm em bership ofthe EEC/EU in
excessofthe expectationsofeven the optim istsof40 yearsago. Asthe analysisofthe econom ic
im pactshasdeveloped,not only the m agnitude but also the scope ofthe econom icbenefitsofEU
m em bership hasbecom e clearer. It isalso clearthat belonging to the EU hasincreased trade by
m uch m ore than belonging to EFT A,originally the preferred form ofintegration forthe U K w ith its
16 T hisisbasedonaguessattheelasticity ofincom etotradeof0.5 or0.75 follow ingtheapproachproposed
by Feyrer(2009). Ifthiscalculationisputonasim ilarbasistothoseinsection4 above,therew ouldbea
reductioninthetradetoGDP ratioofabout8percentagepointsw ithanim pliedincom elossofabout4 per
centofGDP .
17 BothBradford(2003)basedonaprice-gapm ethodology andFontagneetal.(2005)usingagravity m odel
approachfoundthatEU externalbarrierstotradew erequitesubstantialaroundtheturnofthecentury.
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antipathy to ‘ever-closerunion’.18 T hissuggeststhatthe strongestcase foraU K exitispoliticaland
relatestoissuesofsovereignty.
6. Conclusions
European econom ic integration especially through the EEC/EU hashad astrong im pact on trade
flow s. T heeffectsofEU m em bershipontradeappeartoexceed thatw ould haveaccrued from tariff
reductionsalone suggesting that thisentailsadeeperlevelofintegration than w ould have accrued
through afree trade area. T hisisalso borne out by the evidence ofm uch strongertrade creation
from EU com paredw ithEFT A m em bership. T heprocessofEuropeaneconom icintegrationgathered
m om entum in part from ‘dom ino effects’ w hich resulted in EFT A m em bersacceding to the EU to
enhancetheiraccesstoEU m arkets.
T here isvery good reason to believe that European econom ic integration raised incom e levels
significantly but the there islittle evidence in favour ofthe hypothesisthat grow th ratesw ere
perm anently increased. T he incom egainsarem uchgreaterthanw ould beexpected onthebasisof
anarrow w elfare trianglesapproach and entailhigherlevelsofproductivity ascom petition w as
strengthened and investm ent adjusted to new opportunities. W hile it isclearthat good m arket
access(arelatively centrallocation)hasbeen favourable forachieving higherincom e levels,at the
sam e tim e overthe w hole postw arexperience ofintegration there hasbeen evidence ofcatch-up
and convergence in incom e levelsbetw een countriesand ‘peripheral’ countrieslike Ireland w hich
adopted w ell-designed supply-side policieshave been able to take advantage ofEU m em bership to
stim ulateperiodsofrapidgrow th.
T he U K hasclearly benefited in econom icterm sfrom EU m em bership. Indeed,the w elfare gainsit
hasobtained are m uch biggerthan w ere expected even by optim istsat the tim e ofentry in the
1970s. In particular, increased com petition in product m arkets w as im portant for British
productivity perform ancew hichhad suffered undertheprotectionism oftheearly postw ardecades.
T he problem forthe U K isthat,w hile econom icintegration underEU auspiceshasdelivered gains
w hich exceed those itw ould have obtained from stayingin EFT A,the price paid in term sofreduced
sovereignty isregardedby m any Britishvotersastoohigh.
18 Forexam ple,usingBaieretal.(2008,T able5,equation1)bothcountriesbeinginEU raisestradeby e0.65 -1 =
92% w hereasbothcountriesbeinginEEA raisestradeby e0.19 -1 = 21% .
14
References
Aussilloux,V.,Boum ellassa,H.,Em linger,C.andFontagne,L .(2011),“ T heEconom icConsequences
fortheU KandtheEU ofCom pletingtheS ingleM arket” ,BIS Econom icsP aperN o.11.
Bacon,R .,Godley,W .andM cFarquhar,A.(1978),“ T heDirectCostsofBelongingtotheEEC” ,
Econom icP olicy R eview ,4,44-49.
Badinger,H.(2005),“ Grow thEffectsofEconom icIntegration:Evidencefrom theEU M em ber
S tates” ,R eview ofW orldEconom ics,141,50-78.
Badinger,H.andBreuss,F.(2004),“ W hatHasDeterm inedtheR apidP ost-W arGrow thofIntra-EU
T rade?” ,R eview ofW orldEconom ics,140,31-51.
Badinger,H.andBreuss,F.(2011),“ T heQ uantitativeEffectsofEuropeanP ost-W arEconom ic
Integration” ,inM .Jovanovic(ed.),InternationalHandbookontheEconom icsofIntegration.
Cheltenham :Edw ardElgar,285-315.
Badinger,H.andM aydell,N .(2009),“ L egalandEconom icIssuesinCom pletingtheEU Internal
M arketforS ervices:anInterdisciplinary P erspective” ,JournalofCom m onM arketS tudies,47,
693-717.
Baier,S .L .,Bergstrand,J.H.,Egger,P .andM cL aughlin,P .A.(2008),“ DoEconom icIntegration
Agreem entsActually W ork? IssuesinU nderstandingtheCausesandConsequencesofthe
Grow thofR egionalism ” ,T heW orldEconom y,31,461-497.
Balassa,B.(1961),T heT heory ofEconom icIntegration. Hom ew ood,Ill.:Irw in.
Balassa,B.(1975),“ T radeCreationandDiversionintheEuropeanCom m onM arket:anAppraisalof
theEvidence” ,inB.Balassa(ed.),EuropeanEconom icIntegration.Am sterdam :N orthHolland,
79-118.
Baldw in,R .E.(1993),“ A Dom inoT heory ofR egionalism ” ,N BER W orkingP aperN o.4465.
Baldw in,R .E.andJaim ovich,D.(2012),” AreFreeT radeAgreem entsContagious?” ,Journalof
InternationalEconom ics,88,1-16.
Baldw in,R .,DiN ino,V.,Fontagne,L .,DeS antis,R .andT aglioni,D.(2008),“ S tudy ontheIm pactof
theEuroonT radeandForeignDirectInvestm ent” ,EuropeanEconom y Econom icP apersN o.321.
Barnes,S .,Bouis,R .,Briard,P .,Dougherty,S .andEris,M .(2011),“ T heGDP Im pactofR eform :a
S im pleS im ulationFram ew ork” ,O ECD Econom icsDepartm entW orkingP aperN o.834.
Barry,F.(2004),“ Export-P latform ForeignDirectInvestm ent:theIrishExperience” ,EIB P apers,9(2),
9-37.
Bayoum i,T .andEichengreen,B.(1995),“ IsR egionalism S im ply aDiversion? Evidencefrom the
EvolutionoftheEC andEFT A” ,N BER W orkingP aperN o.5283.
15
Berger,H.andN itsch,V.(2008),“ Zoom ingO ut:theT radeEffectoftheEuroinHistorical
P erspective” ,JournalofInternationalM oney andFinance,27,1244-1260.
Berger,H.andR itschl,A.(1995),“ Germ any andtheP oliticalEconom y oftheM arshallP lan,1947-52:
aR e-R evisionistView ” ,inB.Eichengreen(ed.),Europe’sP ostw arR ecovery. Cam bridge:
Cam bridgeU niversity P ress,199-245.
Boltho,A.andEichengreen,B.(2008),“ T heEconom icIm pactofEuropeanIntegration” ,CEP R
DiscussionP aperN o.6820.
Bradford,S .(2003),“ P ayingtheP rice:FinalGoodsP rotectioninO ECD Countries” ,R eview of
Econom icsandS tatistics,85,24-37.
Breinlich,H.(2006),"T heS patialIncom eS tructureintheEuropeanU nion W hatR oleforEconom ic
Geography?",JournalofEconom icGeography,6,593-617.
Broadberry,S .andCrafts,N .(2011),“ O penness,P rotectionism andBritain’sP roductivity
P erform anceovertheL ongR un” ,inG.W ood,T .C.M illsandN .Crafts(eds.),M onetary and
BankingHistory:EssaysinHonourofForestCapie. Abingdon:R outledge,254-286.
Buckley,P .andR uane,F.(2006),"ForeignDirectInvestm entinIreland:P olicy Im plicationsfor
Em ergingEconom ies",T heW orldEconom y,29,1611-1628.
Cam pos,N .F.,Coricelli,F.andM oretti,L .(2014),“ Econom icGrow thandP oliticalIntegration:
Estim atingtheBenefitsfrom M em bershipoftheEuropeanU nionusingtheS ynthetic
CounterfactualsM ethod” ,CEP R DiscussionP aperN o.9968.
Ciccone,A.(2002),"Agglom erationEffectsinEurope",EuropeanEconom icR eview ,46,213-227.
Costinot,A.andR odriguez-Clare,A.(2013),“ T radeT heory w ithN um bers:Q uantifyingthe
ConsequencesofGlobalization” ,CEP R DiscussionP aperN o.9398.
Crafts,N .(2013),“ T heM arshallP lan” ,inR .P arkerandR .W haples(eds.),R outledgeHandbookof
M ajorEventsinEconom icHistory. L ondon:R outledge,203-213.
Crafts,N .andT oniolo,G.(2008),“ EuropeanEconom icGrow th,1950-2005:anO verview ” ,CEP R
DiscussionP aperN o.6863.
Dustm ann,C.andFrattini,T .(2014),“ T heFiscalEffectsofIm m igrationtotheU K” ,Econom icJournal,
124,F593-F643.
Eichengreen,B.(1993),R econstructingEurope’sT radeandP aym ents. M anchester: M anchester
U niversity P ress.
Ennew ,C,Greenaw ay,D. andR eed,G.(1990),“ FurtherEvidenceonEffectiveT ariffsandEffective
P rotectionintheU K” ,O xfordBulletinofEconom icsandS tatistics,52,69-78.
Estevadeordal,A.andT aylor,A.(2013),"IstheW ashingtonConsensusDead? Grow th,O pennessand
theGreatL iberalization,1970s-2000s",R eview ofEconom icsandS tatistics,95,1669-1690.
16
Feyrer,J.(2009),“ T radeandIncom e:ExploitingT im eS eriesinGeography” ,N BER W orkingP aperN o.
14910.
Fontagne,L .,M ayer,T .andZignago,S .(2005),“ T radeintheT riad:How Easy istheAccesstoL arge
M arkets?” ,CanadianJournalofEconom ics,38,1401-1430.
Frankel,J.A.andR om er,D.(1999),“ DoesT radeCauseGrow th?” ,Am ericanEconom icR eview ,89,
379-399.
Gasiorek,M .,S m ith,A.andVenables,A.J.(2002),“ T heAccessionoftheU KtotheEC:aW elfare
Analysis” ,JournalofCom m onM arketS tudies,40,425-447.
Gaskell,S .andP ersson,M .(2010),S tillO utofControl? M easuringElevenYearsofEU R egulation.
L ondon:O penEurope.
Griffith,R .(2001),“ P roductM arketCom petition,Efficiency andAgency Costs:anEm piricalAnalysis” ,
InstituteforFiscalS tudiesW orkingP aperN o.01/12.
Gregg,P .,M achin,S .andM etcalf,D.(1993),“ S ignalsandCycles:P roductivity Grow thandChangein
U nionS tatusinBritishCom panies,1984-9” ,Econom icJournal,103,894-907.
Gropp,R .andKostial,K.(2000),"T heDisappearingT ax Base:IsFDIErodingCorporateIncom e
T axes?",IM FW orkingP aperN o.00/173.
Harrison,G.,R utherford,T .andT arr,D.(1994),“ P roductS tandards,Im perfectCom petition,and
Com pletionoftheM arketintheEuropeanU nion” ,W orldBankP olicy R esearchW orkingP aper
N o.1293.
Hitiris,T .(1978),“ EffectiveP rotectionandEconom icP erform anceinU KM anufacturingIndustry,
1963 and1968” ,Econom icJournal,88,107-120.
Ilzkovitz,F.,Dierx,A.,Kovacs,V.andS ousa,N .(2007),S tepstow ardsaDeeperEconom icIntegration:
theInternalM arketinthe21st Century” ,EuropeanEconom y Econom icP apersN o.271.
Jacks,D.S .,M eissner,C.M .andN ovy,D.(2011),“ T radeBoom s,T radeBusts,andT radeCosts” ,
JournalofInternationalEconom ics,83,185-201.
Josling,T .(1971),“ T heAgriculturalBurden:aR eappraisal” ,inJ.P inder(ed.),T heEconom icsof
Europe. L ondon:CharlesKnight,72-93.
L e,V.P .M .,M inford,P .andN ow ell,E.(2011),“ M easuringtheExtentandCostsofEU
P rotectionism ” ,inM .Jovanovic(ed.), InternationalHandbookontheEconom icsofIntegration.
Cheltenham :Edw ardElgar,316-331.
M achin,S .andW adhw ani,S .(1989),“ T heEffectsofU nionsonO rganisationalChange,Investm ent
andEm ploym ent:Evidencefrom W IR S Data” ,L ondonS choolofEconom icsCentreforL abour
Econom icsDiscussionP aperN o.355.
M addison,A.(2010),HistoricalS tatisticsoftheW orldEconom y,1-2008AD.
http://w w w .ggdc.net/m addison
17
M artinez-Galarraga,J.(2007),N ew Estim atesofR egionalGDP inS pain,1860-1930",Departm entof
Econom ics,U niversitatdeBarcelonaN o.177.
M idelfart,K.H.,O verm an,H.G.andVenables,A.J.(2003),"M onetary U nionandtheEconom ic
Geography ofEurope",JournalofCom m onM arketS tudies,41,847-868.
M idelfart-Knarvik,K.H.,O verm an,H.G.,R edding,S .J.andVenables,A.J.(2000)"T heL ocationof
EuropeanIndustry",EuropeanEconom y Econom icP apersN o.142.
M iller,M .H.(1971),“ Estim atesoftheS taticBalance-of-P aym entsandW elfareCostsCom pared” ,in
J.P inder(ed.),T heEconom icsofEurope.L ondon:CharlesKnight,117-151.
M iller,M .H.andS pencer,J.E.(1977),“ T heS taticEconom icEffectsoftheU KjoiningtheEEC:a
GeneralEquilibrium Approach” ,R eview ofEconom icS tudies,44,71-93.
M ilw ard,A.S .(1984),T heR econstructionofW esternEurope,1945-1951. L ondon:M ethuen.
M ilw ard,A.S .(1992),T heEuropeanR escueoftheN ationS tate. L ondon:R outledge.
M olle,W .(1980),R egionalDisparity andEconom icDevelopm entintheEuropeanCom m unity.
Farnborough:S axonHouse.
M onteagudo,J.,R utkovski,A.andL orenzani,D.(20102),“ T heEconom icIm pactoftheS ervices
Directive:aFirstAssessm entFollow ingIm plem entation” ,EuropeanEconom y Econom icP apers
N o.456.
M orris,C.N .(1980),“ T heCom m onAgriculturalP olicy” ,FiscalS tudies,1(2),17-35.
N ickell,S .J.,N icolitsas,D.,andDryden,N .(1997),“ W hatM akesFirm sP erform W ell?” ,European
Econom icR eview ,41,783-796.
O ECD (1989),Econom iesinT ransition.
O ECD (2007),T ax EffectsonForeignDirectInvestm ent.
O ttaviano,G.,P essoa,J.P .,S am pson,T .andvanR eenen,J.(2014),“ T heCostsandBenefitsof
L eavingtheEU ” ,m im eo,L ondonS choolofEconom ics.
P ahre,R .(2008),P oliticsandT radeCooperationintheN ineteenthCentury. Cam bridge:Cam bridge
U niversity P ress.
P radosdelaEscosura,L .,R oses,J.R .andVillaroya,I.S .(2010),“ S tabilizationandGrow thunder
Dictatorship:theExperienceofFranco’sS pain” ,CEP R DiscussionP aperN o.7731.
P uga,D.(1999),“ T heR iseandFallofR egionalInequalities” ,EuropeanEconom icR eview ,43,303-
334.
R olfe,H.,R ienzo,C.,L alani,M .andP ortes,J.(2013),M igrationandP roductivity:Em ployers’
P ractices,P ublicAttitudesandS tatisticalEvidence,L ondon,N IES R .
18
R ollo,J.andW arw ick,K.(1979),“ T heCAP andR esourceFlow sam ongM em berS tates” ,Governm ent
Econom icS erviceW orkingP aperN o.27
R om alis,J.(2007),“ CapitalT axes,T radeCosts,andtheIrishM iracle” ,JournaloftheEuropean
Econom icAssociation,5,459-469.
S apir,A.(2001),Dom inoEffectsinW esternEuropeanR egionalT rade,1960-1992” ,EuropeanJournal
ofP oliticalEconom y,17,377-388.
S apir,A.(2011),“ EuropeanIntegrationattheCrossroads:aR eview Essay onthe50th Anniversary of
BelaBalassa’sT heory ofEconom icIntegration” ,JournalofEconom icL iterature,49,1200-1229.
S laughter,M .J.(2003),"HostCountry Determ inantsofU S ForeignDirectInvestm entintoEurope",in
H.Herm annandR .L ipsey (eds.),ForeignDirectInvestm entintheR ealandFinancialS ectorof
IndustrialCountries. Berlin:S pringer,7-32.
S traathof,B.,L inders,G-J.,L ejour,A.andM ohlm ann,J.(2008),“ T heInternalM arketandtheDutch
Econom y:Im plicationsforT radeandGrow th” ,CP B Docum entN o.168.
Venables,A.J.(2005),"EuropeanIntegration:aView from GeographicalEconom ics",S w edish
Econom icP olicy R eview ,12,143-169.
W illiam son,J.(1971),“ T radeandEconom icGrow th” ,inJ.P inder(ed.),T heEconom icsofEurope.
L ondon:CharlesKnight,19-45.
W eigall,D.andS tirk,P .(1992),T heO riginsandDevelopm entoftheEuropeanCom m unity. L eicester:
L eicesterU niversity P ress.
W inters,L .A.(1987),“ BritaininEurope:aS urvey ofQ uantitativeT radeS tudies” ,JournalofCom m on
M arketS tudies,25,315-335.
19
Table 1. A Chronology of Economic Integration of Markets
1950 EuropeanP aym entsU nionstarts
1952 EuropeanCoalandS teelCom m unity established
1958 EuropeanEconom icCom m unity startsw ith6 m em bers(Belgium .France,
Italy,L uxem bourg,N etherlands,W estGerm any)
1958 EuropeanP aym entsU niondiscontinued
1960 EuropeanFreeT radeAssociationstartsw ith7m em bers(Austria,Denm ark,
N orw ay,P ortugal,S w eden,S w itzerlandandU K)
1962 Com m onAgriculturalP olicy begins
1968 EEC Custom sU nioncom pletedandCom m onExternalT ariffestablished
1970 IcelandjoinsEFT A
1972 EEC-EFT A freetradeagreem entssigned
1973 1st Enlargem ent:Denm ark,IrelandandU KjoinEEC;Denm arkandU Kleave
EFT A
1981 2nd Enlargem ent:GreecejoinsEEC
1986 3rd Enlargem ent:P ortugalandS painjoinEEC;P ortugalleavesEFT A;Finland
joinsEFT A
1987 S ingleEuropeanActcom esintoeffect
1990 Germ anunification:form erEastGerm anlandsjoinEEC
1991 L iechtensteinjoinsEFT A
1992 EEC andEFT A establishEuropeanEconom icArea
1993 M aastrichtT reaty establishingEuropeanU nioncom esintoeffect
1995 4th Enlargem ent:Austria,FinlandandS w edenjoinEU andleaveEFT A
1999 Eurozoneestablishedw ith11 m em bercountries(Austria,Belgium ,Finland,
France,Germ any,Ireland,Italy,L uxem bourg,N etherlands,P ortugal,S pain)
2001 GreecejoinsEurozone
2004 5th Enlargem ent:10 countriesjoinEU (CzechR epublic,Cyprus,Estonia,
Hungary,L atvia,L ithuania,M alta,P oland,S lovakia,S lovenia)





2013 7th Enlargem ent:CroatiajoinsEU as28th m em ber
2014 L atviajoinsEurozone
2015 L ithuaniajoinsEurozoneas19th m em ber
20











1929 0.99 1.10 1.18 1.00 1.22 0.87
1938 1.33 1.12 2.26 1.21 1.54 0.98
1950 1.12 1.27 1.55 1.22 1.36 0.98
1960 0.91 1.01 1.52 1.22 1.25 0.91
1970 0.73 0.79 1.24 1.10 1.21 0.90
1980 0.55 0.61 0.89 0.74 0.86 0.69
1990 0.53 0.56 0.74 0.70 0.84 0.77
2000 0.61 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.90 0.88
N ote:tradecostsareinferredusingagravity m odelandcom prisebothpolicy andnon-policy
barrierstotrade;1929-38 estim atesarenotstrictly com parablew iththosefor1950-2000;
estim atesthatincludeS painarefor1939 not1938.
S ource:dataunderlyingJacksetal.(2011)generously providedby DennisN ovy
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Table 3. Volume of Exports in 2000 (1960 = 100)
Intra-EU15 Extra-EU15 Total
Austria 1395.6 1273.8 1346.3
Belgium -L uxem bourg 1209.4 857.6 1088.3
Denm ark 632.8 728.2 665.0
Finland 962.9 1268.2 1079.2
France 1766.1 843.1 1230.5
Germ any 1002.2 874.7 942.1
Greece 1586.6 1946.3 1792.5
Ireland 3769.2 12587.6 5356.2
Italy 1820.2 1265.6 1520.0
N etherlands 1585.1 961.7 1389.2
P ortugal 1043.2 197.4 555.1
S pain 2690.2 2009.2 2429.7
S w eden 811.2 1142.7 939.2
U K 1099.5 442.1 636.8
EU 15 1320.8 834.2 1075.6
W orldT rade 987.5
S ources: BadingerandBreuss(2004)and,forw orldtrade,W T O w ebsite.
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Table 4. Trade Effects of European Trade Agreements (% per year)
Intra Trade Extra Trade
1956-1973
EC6 +3.2** EC6-EFT A7 -1.5*
EFT A7 +2.3** EC6-otherO ECD -1.7*
EFT A-otherO ECD
1972-1980
N ew EC-EC6 +5.9** N ew EC-EFT A5 -1.2
N ew EC-otherO ECD +2.6**
U K-Com m onw ealth -6.7*
1975-1992
Greece-EC9 +2.0** Greece-otherO ECD -1.7
P ortugal/S pain-EC10 +2.9** P ortugal/S pain-otherO ECD -0.4
N ote:* = significantat5% ,** = significantat1% .
S ource:Bayoum iandEichengreen(1995)
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Table 5. Post-Accession Differences between Level of Actual and Synthetic GDP per
Person (%)
After 5 Years After 10 Years Total
Denm ark 10.3 14.3 23.9
Ireland 5.2 9.4 48.9
U nitedKingdom 4.8 8.6 23.7
Greece -11.6 -17.3 -19.8
P ortugal 11.7 16.5 18.4
S pain 9.3 13.7 19.8
Austria 4.5 6.4 7.2
Finland 2.2 4.0 4.4
S w eden 0.8 2.4 3.2
S ource:Cam posetal.(2014)
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Table 6. Unconditional Convergence Regression Western European Regions.
1950-73 1950-73 1950-73 1973-2005 1973-2005 1973-2005
Constant 6.660 5.292 5.633 3.218 2.340 2.419
(39.755) (17.567) (13.926) (19.608) (9.731) (7.913)
InitialY/P -0.051
% L eader (-14.487)
S pain 0.920 0.826 0.793 0.660
(3.537) (2.975) (4.243) (3.350)
W estGerm any 1.046 0.917 -0.229 -0.265
(4.346) (3.683) (-1.247) (-1.514)
U K -0.833 -0.798 0.195 0.082
(-3.539) (-3.198) (1.088) (0.469)
France 0.169 0.167 -0.044 -0.028
(0.766) (0.765) (-0.263) (-0.176)
Italy 0.716 0.645 0.085 0.023




L uxem bourg (-0.462) (0.807)
R 2 0.713 0.870 0.873 0.420 0.662 0.696
S ources:ow ncalculationsbasedonGDP perpersonrelativetonationalaverageforFrance,Italy,
N etherlands,S pain,U KandW estGerm any forsetofsam e85 regionsobtainedfrom M olle(1980),
M artinez-Galarraga(2007)andEurostat,R egionalS tatistics,variousissues. T heserelativitiesw ere
thenappliedtonationalestim atesforrealGDP perpersonreportedinM addison(2010). Density (=
population/landarea)calculatedfrom sam esources. DistancestoL uxem bourgfrom
w w w .m apcrow .infoplusinterceptof100 km .
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Table 7. Geography and Real GDP per Person Regressions
1950 1973 2005
Constant 10.032 10.646 10.678
(19.196) (24.422) (23.835)
L ogDensity 0.206 0.122 0.103
(4.318) (3.178) (2.633)
L ogDistanceto -0.407 -0.306 -0.208
L uxem bourg (-5.816) (-5.231) (-3.477)
R 2 0.802 0.652 0.327
N ote:dependentvariableisthelogofrealGDP /P erson,country dum m iesincludedbutnotreported
anddensity instrum entedusinglandareaasinCiccone(2002).
S ources:ow ncalculationsbasedondatafrom sourcesforT able6.
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Table 8. Balance of Payments and Static Welfare Effects of UK Entry into EEC: 1970s’ and
1980s’ Estimates (% GDP)
Ex Ante (1) Ex-Ante (2) Ex-Post
Balance of Payments
M anufactures -0.3 -0.2 -2.6
Im portS avingonFood +1.0 +0.4 +0.7
ExcessFoodCost -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
O fficialT ransfers -1.0 -0.6 -0.6
T otal -0.6 -0.6 -2.6
Welfare
T radeCreation +0.1 +0.1 +0.4
S cale +0.5
Com petition +0.5 +1.7
M anufacturesDeficit -0.1 -0.1 -0.9
Im portS avingonFood +0.4 +0.2 +0.1
ExcessFoodCost -0.4 -0.2 -0.1
O fficialT ransfers -1.2 -0.8 -0.7
T otal -1.2 +0.2 +1.3
N otes:w elfareeffectsbasedonorthodoxcorrectionofbalanceofpaym entsdeficits/surpluses,see
text. Excessfoodcostreferstopaym entstoEEC farm ersforagriculturalcom m oditiespurchasedat
EEC prices,i.e.atgreaterthanw orldprices. Ex-posttradecreationincludesscaleeffects.
S ources:
Ex-Ante(1)generalequilibrium basedonM iller(1971);alaterversionoftheseestim atesw as
publishedasM illerandS pencer(1977).
Ex-Ante(2):partialequilibrium basedonJosling(1971)foragricultureandonW illiam son(1971)for
m anufactures.
Ex-P ost:com piledusingM orris(1980)andR olloandW arw ick(1979)foragriculture,Gasioreketal.
(2002)fortradecreation,scaleandcom petitioneffectsinm anufacturing,andW inters(1987)for
balanceofpaym entseffectsinm anufacturing.
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Table 9. Modern Ex-Ante Estimates of the Static Welfare Effects of UK Exit from the EU
(%GDP)
Optimistic Pessimistic
IncreasedEU /U KT ariffs 0 -0.14
IncreasedEU /U KN T Bs -0.40 -0.93
FutureFallsinEU /U KN T Bs -1.26 -2.55
FiscalT ransfers +0.53 +0.53
T otal -1.13 -3.09
S ource:O ttavianoetal.(2014)usingam ethodology derivedfrom CostinotandR odriguez-Clare
(2013).
